12.1. Constitution of Judiciary The Mānūr inscription of Pāṇḍya Varaguṇa Mārañjaḍayaṉ is well known (1. South Indian Inscriptions Vol. XIV, No. 37, Epigraphica Indica Vol. XXII. p. 5). Writing on this epigraph, Prof. K. A. N. Sastri states “This Mānūr record may be taken perhaps as giving a type of the constitution of village assemblies in this period in the south of the Pāṇḍya country. Membership in the assembly was regulated by qualifications of property and learning very much as in the well-known inscription of Uttaramērūr in the early 10th century C.E”. (2. K. A. N. Sastri. The Pāṇḍyan Kingdom Madras. 1971. p. 83.)
Sri. A. S. Ramanatha Iyer, the editor of South Indian Inscriptions, Volume XIV referring to this inscription, states: - “This inscription is of interest as giving the rules and qualifications which governed the admission of members to the assembly Mānanilai-nallūr”. (3. South Indian Inscription Vol, XIV. p. 28)
All the scholars dealing with the inscription have taken this to refer to the qualification of members to be elected to the village assembly, but this is an inscription dealing with the constitution of the law court of the village. The use of words “Manṟu” and Manṟādutal in the inscription is a pointer in that direction. It is needless to say that all inscriptions are Lekhya Pramāṇas, i.e., written documents and as such use legal terminology. The word manṟu etc., frequently occurring in epigraphs is used in connection with courts. Even in literature the word is used in the sense of court dharmāsana (Periyapurāṇam). From this angle the inscription of Mānūr assumes greater significance.
The Mahāsabhā met at the Govardhana of the village and agreed upon certain decisions for constituting “the court of justice”.
South Indian Inscription XIV No. 37 (A.R. No. 423 of 1906) MĀNŪR, TIRUNELVĒLI ONE ON THE PILLARS IN THE AMBALAVĀṆA TEMPLE 𑌸𑍍𑌵𑌸𑍍𑌤𑌿 ஸ்ரீ கொ மாறஞ்ச் சடையற்க்கு யாண்டு முப்பத்தஞ்சு நாள் நான்னூற்றறு பத்து ஒன்பது இன்னாள் களக்[கு]டி நாட்டு 𑌬𑍍𑌰𑌫𑍍𑌮𑌦𑍇𑌯ம் மானன[நி]லை நல் ஊர் ம(மா)ஹா 𑌸𑌭𑌯𑍋ம் பெகுங்குறி கூற்றி ஸ்ரீ 𑌗𑍋𑌵𑌰𑍍𑌧𑌨த்து கூடி இருந்து இவ்வூர் ம(மா)ஹா 𑌸𑌭𑌯𑍋ம் குடி மன்றாடுவதனுக்கு செய்த… யாவது இவ்வுர் பங்குடையார் மக்கள் 𑌸𑌬𑍈𑌯𑌿ல் மன்றாடுகிறது ஒரு 𑌧𑌮… உட்பட மந்திர 𑌬𑍍𑌰𑌾𑌹𑍍𑌮𑌣ம் வல்லார் 𑌸𑍁𑌵𑍍𑌰த்தராய் இருப்பாரெ ஒரு பங்கினுக்கு ஒருத்தரெ 𑌸𑌭𑍈𑌯𑌿ல் மன்றாடுவதாகாவும் விலையும் [𑌪𑍍𑌰𑌤𑌿𑌗𑍍𑌰𑌫]மும் 𑌸𑍀𑌧𑌨[மு முடை]யார் ஒரு 𑌧𑌾𑌮𑍍மும்பட மந்திர 𑌬𑍍𑌰𑌾𑌹𑍍𑌮𑌣ம் வல்லார் 𑌸𑍁𑌵𑍍𑌰த்தராய் இருப்பாரெ மன்றாடுவதாகாவும் இதன் மெற்பட்டது விலையாலும் 𑌪𑍍𑌰கி𑌗𑍍𑌰𑌹த்தாலும் 𑌸𑍀𑌧𑌨த்தாலும் 𑌷𑍍𑌰𑌾𑌵ணை புகுவாம் முழு சிராவணை… அன்றி கால் சிராவணையும் அறைசிராவணையும் முக்கால் சிராவணையும் புகவும் பணிக்கவும் பெரறாதா[ரா]கவும் பங்கு விலைக்கு கொள்(வ)வ[ ]ர் ஒரு 𑌵𑍇𑌦ம் எல்லா இயமும் 𑌸𑍁𑌪𑌰𑌿𑌸𑌿𑌷𑍍𑌟ம் பரிக்ஷை தந்தார்கெ ஷ்ரவணை பணிப்ப்தாகவும் இப்பரிசு அன்றி ஷ்ரவணை புக்காரையும் பின்னையும் இக்கச்சத்தில் பட்ட பரிசெ மன்றாடுவதாக(.)வும் இப்பரிசினால் முழுஷ்ரவணை இல்லாதாரை எவ்வகைப்பட்ட வாரியமும் எற்றபெறாதாராகவும் இப்பரிசு செய்கின்றாரும் அன்றென்று(?) குத்துக்கால் செய்யபெறாதாரகவும் குத்துக்கால் செய்வார்க்கு [...]ப்பாரையும் வெவ்வெற்று…ஐயனஞ்சு காசு தண்டங்கொண்டு பின்னயும் இக்கச்சத்தில் பட்ட பரிசெ செய்வதாகவும் இப்பரிசெ பணித்து …ம𑌹𑌾𑌸𑌬𑍈𑌯𑍋ம் ம𑌹𑌾𑌸𑌬𑍈𑌯𑍋ர் (Grantha text typed using: Aksharamukha App)
The translation of the text according to us would be as follows: Translation “Svasti Śrī Four hundred and sixty ninth day and thirty fifth year of king Mārañjaḍaiyaṉ. This day, we the members of the Mahāsabhā of the village Mānanilai-nallūr, in Kalakkuḍi nāḍu met at Govardhana after meeting as general assembly, passed the following resolutions relating to the constitution of the court of the Mahāsabhā. The eligible representative of the descendants of the shareholders of the village in court is one who is well-learned in mantra and in Dharma Śāstra, is of virtuous conduct and is a Brāhmaṇa. Furthermore, only one representative of each share can be considered. Once elected, the members will enquire about cases in the sabhā. Among those, who bought land in the village, received it as a gift, or as strīdhana, those learned in mantra, a Brāhmaṇa, and in Dharma Śastra alone (mentioned again in the inscription) and of virtuous conduct suvrittarāy iruppār are eligible to hear the cases in the sabhā. Further, those who got land by purchase, gift or as strīdhana, will be eligible to serve as hearers, Śrāvaṇai puhuvār. They will not be permitted or ordered to hear quarter, half or three fourth of the case (as hearers) but only the full case. Among buyers of the shares, only those who pass an examination (parīkṣai) in all parts of one Veda, including its pariśiṣṭas, are to be admitted as hearers. Further those who enter as hearers apart from these decisions should hear cases only as directed in this kacca (இகச்சதில் - bond/stipulation). One who does not become a full hearer, as per this stipulation, should not be appointed for any Vāriyam, i.e., a sub-committee. Those who satisfy the above conditions should not refuse (or obstruct) to serve. Those who obstruct or abet obstruction will be individually fined five Kāsu and even after paying the fine, they should serve as per this resolution. “We, the members of the Sabhā, took the decision as resolved above” . (The translation given above is this author's own which is different from the one given by Śāstri).
The above inscription raises many interesting points on the administration of justice in the Pāṇḍya country during the 9th century. The Pāṇḍya ruler in whose reign the decision was taken by the Mānūr sabhā is identified with Parāntaka Varaguṇa, who ascended the throne in 768 C.E. The date of this inscription would then fall in 805 C.E. The Mahāsabhā was functioning already in that village of Mānūr, and the decision was taken by that Sabhā.
As mentioned earlier, the Sabhā met in the Govardhana of the village, where it deliberated the resolution. At Uttaramērūr, the Govardhana of the village was an active center from 9th century CE to 11th century (2. F. Gros and R. Nagaswamy, Uttaramērūr. p. 84) and the presiding deity is mentioned as Mahāviṣṇu. The central sabhā maṇḍapa of Uttaramērūr, also housed Lord Viṣṇu in whose immediate presence the transactions were conducted. (3. Ibid. 68) Viṣṇu being the presiding deity of dharma, it was proper that the Mahasabhā of Mānūr took decisions relating to the law court in the Govardhana of the village. The presence of Govardhana (connected with legal administration) in villages separated by over five hundred miles, one in the northern part of Tamiḻnāḍu (near Madras) and another in the extreme south in Tirunelvēli, one under the Pallavas and the other under the Pāṇḍya, both in the 9th century, shows an almost uniform pattern of village set up and judicial functioning.
That the Mahāsabhā met and decided about the qualification for the members of the Court illustrates the dynamic role of the village assembly in the ancient Tamiḻ country.
The wordings of the Mānūr epigraph is indicative of two categories of judges: viz. the Manṟāḍuvārs (judges for disputes) and the Śrāvaṇai-puhuvār (hearers). The term Sabhāṣad occurs in some Vedic passages and in many of the Dharma Śāstras. The combined effect of various texts is to show that the members of the sabhā fell into two categories, some of them having a more definite role than the rest. (1. S. Varadachariar, The Hindu Judicial system, Lucknow 1946–p. 102). “The differentiation between the two groups of members of the sabhā is emphasized in a passage of Vyāsa which speaks of them as the Niyukta (appointed or placed in authority) and the Aniyukta (not formally appointed and is not entitled to vote). Kātyāyana (author of Kātyāyana-smṛtī) also recognises a differentiation though he changes the terminology. According to him the select are the Sabhyas. That Niyojana (directing or appointing) was a deliberate process is shown by the passage in Nārada which refers to the Niyuktas, as well tested (Suparīkṣitas)”. (2. Ibid) In the Mānūr inscription, it is quite clear that the word Manṟāḍuvār stands for judges who hear disputes. The word Śrāvaṇai-puhuvār seems to stand for hearers, (Śrotārah) of the Dharma Śāstras. (Śrāvaṇai means hearer, derived from the root śrāvaṇa to hear). The reason for the stipulation that the Śrāvaṇai-puhuvār will not be permitted to serve or are ordered to serve for a quarter, half or three–fourth of the hearing is not known. It is possible that the Mānūr sabhā faced some difficulties since the Śrāvaṇai-puhuvār dissociated themselves from the proceedings in the middle of the hearings. The tendency to dissociate oneself from civil or criminal cases especially so when their role is not definitive is quite natural. So, it became necessary for the Mānūr sabhā to bind the Śrāvaṇai-puhuvār to remain for the whole proceedings.
There is another stipulation in the Mānūr decisions. One who buys a share in the village can be allowed to serve as a Śrāvaṇai-puhuvār only after he passes a test in one Veda, inclusive of its pariśiṣṭa (supplement texts). The inscription reads “parīkṣai tantārkke śrāvaṇai paṇippad āhavum”. That the Niyuktas should be “well tested”, suparīkṣitas is referred to by Nārada (3. The Hindu Judicature p. 105). The use of the word parīkṣaitantār, in Mānūr clearly conforms to the Dharma Śāstra.
The sabhā of Mānūr probably had experienced some obstruction or abetment to obstruction, which called for a fine being imposed. The village Mānūr called Mānanilai-nallūr seems to have been established as a Brahmadēya with a number of families as shareholders, not many generations earlier. By the time of the record, the character of the village had undergone a change. New settlers came in either buying land or accepting land as a gift and in some cases marrying the girls of the village and obtaining land as strīdhana. In the families of the original shareholders (they being joint families) many grown-ups with required qualifications were present. Howver, with the original character of the village having undergone change, it became necessary for the sabhā to deliberate and decide about the constitution of the court, taking future changes into consideration as well. The interests of the descendants of both the original shareholders as well as those who came as new settlers, was safeguarded (1. The inscription also indicates as early as the 8th century that the shares in a Brahmadēya village could be sold.)
Only those who were qualified for the full śrāvaṇai could be appointed for any Vāriyam (committee). This decision shows that different types of Vāriyams were functioning as early as the 8th century in the extreme south. The inscription hence points to a robust functioning of the village assemblies in 8th century Tamiḻ land, that the village sabhās were free to appoint its own court and stipulate the requisite qualifications. The absence of any royal order or officer shows that the sabhasā were free to act by themselves. The Mānūr epigraph is a very interesting record of the early Pāṇḍya period showing the role played by the Dharma Śāstra in Tamiḻ land. Be it the northern part or the southernmost part of Tamiḻ land, or the territory ruled by the Pallavas, the Pāṇḍyas, the Cōḻas or other dynasties, we see based on many inscriptions, that the village setup retained its constitutional authority derived from the Dharma Śāstra. A comparison between the Mānūr record and the famous Uttaramērūr record of Parāntaka would be interesting. The Uttaramērūr record relates to the constitution of various sub committees, to serve under the sabhā, while the Mānūr record relates to the constitution of the law court. In Mānūr, no royal officer was present when the sabhā met to take any decision, but, in Uttaramērūr, a royal officer, generally a Brāhmin was present. In Mānūr a knowledge of Dharma Śāstra was stipulated along with mantra and the requirement for manṟāduvār to be a Brāhmaṇa. In Uttaramērūr, knowledge of Dharma Śāstra was not mandated. On the other hand, efficiency in administration (kāryattil nipuṇarāy iruppār) was mandated. Those sub committees being working committees, the insistence was more on working efficiency. The insistence on the knowledge of Dharma Śāstra at Mānūr confirms our conclusion that the record deals with the law courts. Both, the records of Mānūr and Uttaramērūr, prescribe virtuous conduct (suvrittar in Mānūr and ācāraśīla in Uttaramērūr) which is invariably mentioned in the Dharma Śāstras.
12.2. Civil justice under the Pāṇdyas The disposal of lawsuits-both criminal and civil - was the primary responsibility of the king in ancient India. He was the supreme judge of his country and was expected to hear lawsuits daily as a part of his duty. Two interesting epigraphs from the Tamiḻ country, dating back to 8th-9th centuries C.E. give us a glimpse into the disposal of civil suits by the king himself. Both relate to the early Pāṇḍya period. One is the celebrated Vēḷvikkuḍi grant (Epigraphia Indica Vol. XVII pages 291-309.) of Parāntaka Neḍuñjaḍaiyaṉ and the other is the Daḷavāypuram grant (T. N. Subramaniam, Transactions of the Archaeological Society - 1962, p. 55.) of Parāntaka Vīranārāyaṇaṉ. Both the copper plates have been edited earlier but have not been analysed from the point of view of legal administration. An analysis of the plates is made here from this angle which throws new light on the administration of civil justice in ancient Tamiḻ land. Most of the copper plates found thus far belong to the class of documents known as dāna patra (gift deeds). Kinds of documents: There are ten kinds of documents according to Vyāsa and Prajāpati (3. B. Guru Raja Rao, Ancient Hindu Judicature-1920. P.108.) They are: –
Number Name Description 1 Upagata Receipts 2 Ādhi-patrai Mortgage 3 Kraya-patra Sale deed 4 Sth1iti-patra Perpetual conduct 5 Sandhi-patra Compact 6 Viṣuddhi-patra Purificatory deed. 7 Vibhāga-patra Partition deed 8 Dāna-patra Gift deed 9 Dāśa-patra Enslavement deed 10 Sīmā-vivāda-patra Settlement of boundary dispute The Pallava and the Pāṇḍya plates, excepting the two mentioned above, refer to gifts of lands either to individuals or to institutions such as temples. In all these cases the king made the gift himself to increase his merit, health, victory, and prosperity, or at the request of others. But the Vēḷvikkuḍi and the Daḷavāypuram grants belong to a different class of royal records. In both the cases gifts of lands were made by one of the ancestors of the ruler. However, the lands were subsequently lost by the descendants of the donees, who appealed to the king directly. Having examined the cases, the king restored the lands to the descendants of the original donees. Thus, they relate to the settlement of ownership right by the king in his capacity as a Supreme Judge. It would therefore be interesting to examine both the records in terms of ancient legal administration as reflected in the Dharma Śāstras.
12.3. Vēḷvikkuḍi Grant The Vēḷvikkuḍi grant of Parāntaka Neduñjaḍaiyaṉ is bilingual comprising Sanskrit and Tamiḻ parts (like the other copper plates). The Sanskrit portion stops with the listing of the genealogy of Parāntaka. The Tamiḻ part begins straight away with the details of the appeal that the village Vēḷvikkuḍi was gifted to one Naṟkoṟṟaṉ also known as Koṟkai Kilāṉ, by the Pāṇḍya ruler; Palyāgaśālai Mudukuḍumip peruvaḻudi, when he completed a Yāga (Vēḷvi). It is said that the village was in long in the possession of the donee (nīḍu bhukti tuyttapiṉ) when Kali king, named Kalabhraṉ overthrew a number of rulers (Adhirājās) including Vēḷvikkuḍi and deprived the donees of the enjoyment of the village.
A descendant of the donee, whose name is given as Koṟkai Kilāṉ Kāmakkāṇi Narasiṅgaṉ, went to the palace of the Pāṇḍya ruler, Parāntaka Neḍuñjaḍaiyaṉ, at Kūḍal and made his appeal aloud at the outskirts (akrōdhikka). The king himself heard this loud talk, called him inside and enquired into the matter. The appellant told the king that after the donees were deprived of their lawful enjoyment of the village six Pāṇḍya rulers (Kaḍuṅgoṉ, Avani Cūlāmaṇi, Seliyaṉ Sendaṉ, Arikēsari, Kōccaḍayaṉ and Rājasiṁhaṉ) had passed away. “This land was given by your ancestor Mudukuḍimi Peruvaḻudi. The name of the village is Vēḷvikkuḍi situated in Pākanūr-kūṟṟam (territorial subdivision). This gift was nullified by the Kalabhras”, appealed Narasiṅgaṉ. On hearing this, the king asked the appellant to produce evidence that the land had actually been in their possession (nāṭṭāniṉ palamayātal kāṭṭu enna). Thereupon the appellant showed written evidence to prove his rights. The king being satisfied with the evidence provided, ordered rightaway that the village gifted by his ancestor be reconfirmed by him as well.
The copper plate then details the boundaries of the village and mentions Mūvēnda-maṅgaḷap-pēraraiyaṉ as the Ājñapti of the grant. A few words used in this text are clearly legal terms employed in Dharma Śāstras.
The description of the village gifted said that it was in their enjoyment for long - nīḍu bhukti. Bhukti enjoyment (possession) is considered important evidence in civil suits. The disputing party, when called upon should produce valid evidence (pramāṇa) to prove his case. “Proof is of three kinds. 1. Human (mānuṣika) 2. Divine (deivīka). and 3. Enjoyment (bhukti) Human proof is furnished by a) documents (likhita,) b) witness (sākṣi). The Divine proof consists of ordeals.
Bhukti - enjoyment therefore comes foremost as a mode of proof in respect of rights to immovable property. As possession is an incident of ownership, it is recognized as a mode of proof of ownership. Hārita, the author of Hārītasmṛti describes title as the root and possession (bhukti) as the branch of a tree. Mere possession, however, is not proof of ownership. It is the legal title - Āgama (lawful acquisition) such as that required by gift, purchase etc., confers ownership. Such a title has greater validity than mere possession in determining ownership. According to Yājñavalkya, title however perfect, if unaccompanied by slight possession is of no value. Possession is insisted upon by both Kātyāyana and Bṛhaspati for completion of legal title deeds. But mere enjoyment from generation to generation is by itself valid proof of ownership though unaccompanied by proof of title. As such, long possession raises the presumption of legal title. This exception will apply only in cases of enjoyment for a period lasting beyond the memory of man. In the case of immemorial enjoyment or for over three generations, it is not possible to trace the existence or otherwise of titles as the origin of possession and therefore mere possession is recognized as a mode of proof” (Ibid pp. 61-63.).
In the case of the Vēḷvikkuḍi grant, the owners had been deprived of their property for over six generations. There were two acceptable valid proofs. 1. Documents which the descendants were able to produce. In the deed it is referred to as “Nāḷttāniṉ paḻamai yānatu”. It probably refers to the records in the country accounts that it belonged to the family of Koṟkai Kilāṉs. It is not known whether the original dāna-patra was lost or confiscated. In its absence the country accounts were shown as valid proof. 2. The second evidence was the actual enjoyment for a long period (Nīḍu-bhukti). The use of the word “bhukti” in the Vēḷvikkuḍi grant clearly indicates its legal implication. As two valid Pramāṇās were produced, the king had no hesitation in reconferring the title on the descendant.
In describing the Pāṇḍya ruler, Parāntaka, who heard the case, and reconferred the gift, the following significant titles are used: manūpamaṉ, kaṇtaka-niṣṭuraṉ, and gūḍha-nirṇayaṉ, which are terms associated with Dharma. In the Śrīvara-maṅgalam plates, the same ruler is described as one following the path of Mānū darśana, who extolled elders and did Kaṇṭaka sodhana.
“Kautilya's Arthaśāstra describes two classes of courts called Dharmasthīya, and ‘Kaṇṭaka-sodhana’ as prevalent at that time. The Dharmasthīya courts had jurisdiction over the administration of civil and criminal justice in respect of ordinary matter. The Kaṇṭaka-sodhana courts which consisted of three commissioners seem to have exercised special jurisdiction over matters of commerce and industry, prevention of breach of peace and determination of grave offences against the state. They saw to the enforcement of contracts among artisans, the regulation of their wages and kept constant vigil over the detection and prevention of heinous crimes”. In the famous Uttaramērūr inscription of Parāntaka about 'grāma-kaṇṭakas', reference has been made to criminals who have turned against the village. (2. Epi. Indi. Vol. XXII). The fact that Pāṇḍya Neduñjaḍaiyan performed “Kaṇṭaka-sodhana” himself shows that the concept was well known in Tamiḻ country in the 8th century and the king himself headed that council to hear heinous crimes against the state.
However, one point is not clear from the Vēḷvikkuḍi grant - namely why the appeal was not preferred, and why the descendants waited for nearly six generations. 12.4. Daḷavāypuram Plates The Daḷavāypuram plates of Parāntaka Vīranārayaṇa also refers to a dispute. In this case the gifted land was misappropriated, and an appeal was made to the king. The king restored the right which is the purport of the grant. The Daḷavāypuram plates also consist of two parts, the first in Sanskrit and the second in Tamiḻ. Unlike the Vēḷvikkuḍi grant, the dispute and the decision are recorded both in the Sanskrit and the Tamiḻ parts. The Sanskrit portion is interesting because of its terminology. The case is briefly as follows. The Pāṇḍya ruler Kaḍuṅgōṉ gifted a village Śrīmaṅgalam as a Brahmadēya to twelve Brāhmins. Another Pāṇḍya ruler, whose name is not mentioned but who is said to have died at Kaludūr is said to have gifted the village Somāsik-kuṟicci to one Kāṭaka Somayājī who became the exclusive owner of the Brahmadēya. But both the dāna-patras, (the copper plates) were lost during troubled conditions (marak-kēḍu) (probably referring to Kalabhra occupation). Part of this Sōmasik-kuṟicci was subsequently separated by a Śūdra who appropriated it to himself under the new name Madhuratara-nallūr. (Ibid pp. 8.) So, the appeal was referred to the King. The appellant was one Nārāyaṇaṉ Kēsavaṉ of Sōmāsik-kuṟucci, who served as a confidential officer of the Pāṇḍya. The appeal was that: – “The new village Madhuratara-nallūr should be restored to Sōmāsik-kuṟucci, the new Śūdra occupant should be expelled from the land, the boundaries of the villages Śrīmaṅgalam and Sōmāsik-kuṟucci which are mixed up should be redefined and the two villages clubbed together, and a copper plate charter issued confirming the grant”.
The king immediately agreed and ordered accordingly. There is no mention of the production of evidence either in the Sanskrit portion or in the Tamiḻ portion. The king did not ask for any evidence at all. At least the charter is not specific on this issue. The person Nārāyaṇaṉ Kēsavaṉ who appealed is referred to as a highly learned, a great scholar in political science (Kṣatramatam uṇarntu), a person of pure and high integrity (śuddha śīla ācāraṉ) and above all was a trustworthy officer serving the king (Viśvāsa Karmaṅgatkāya taṉmaiyaṉ). Since the appellant was a trustworthy person and an officer of high integrity, the ruler must have decided the case considering him also as a śākṣi. However, the land was not claimed by the appellant for himself, but on behalf of the village assembly of Śrīmaṅgalam and Sōmāsik-kuṟucci. The king giving the order is mentioned as Mānu-caritaṉ which is interesting.
Sah Somāsik-kurucchi iti khyātah-tasya eka desa bhūh Madhurasthāna sadgrama nāmnā śūdrabhilanghita. tam ācchidya tatah pūrva svāmibhogyam prakalpya ca, tasyah śūdrakṛta ākhyānavyavṛkittm upapadya ca, tadekibhūta Somāsik-kurucchih ekatām saha Śrīmaṅgalena sampādya Suddha-pustaka-lēkhayā grāmānvaya paurastya tāmrapa. tatṭpramānayoh nāśadoṣanirākartum tayoh ca ekatva buddhaye aikyena grāmayoh kritvā simānam karinipadaih tāmrapaṭṭa pramānañca kalpayitvā dīyatam. (D. Plates line 43 to 47)
In this case the officer should be considered a śākṣi - witness. According to Nārada, the king himself and his officers could be made śākṣi. Here the king's officer Nārāyaṇaṉ Kēsavaṉ is to be considered a witness, for he is described as belonging to a good family and a follower of śrauta (Vedic) and smārta (Dharma Śāstra) path (śrauta smārta adhvagena). According to Yājñavalkya, śrauta smārta kriyāpara (followers of śrauta and smārta paths), satyavādi kulīnas, etc., are to be considered as witnesses. It is interesting that in the copper plate the same words “śrauta śmārta advaga” occur.
When the document is in another country, wrongly drafted, eaten away by ants, stolen, broken, burnt, or lost, another document should be prepared. (1. Yājñavalkya - Lekhya V. 91)
The new document is prepared in a process called suddhi.
In the Daḷavāypuram plate, the document was lost and the ownership was in dispute. So, the document had to be prepared anew which in Dharma Śāstra is called as Sandhigdha-lēkhya-suddhi (2. Yajñyavalkhya - V. 92.). In this copper plate the same term Śuddha-pustaka-lekhayā is used. Further in the Daḷavāypuram charter, the loss is called Nāsadoṣa, and the śuddhi was intended to remove this defect, referred to in the copper plates as nāśa-doṣa-nirākartum. The request in the plate is mentioned as tāmra> paṭṭa pramāṇam kalpayitva diyatām. The technical term pramāṇa is used in a legal sense here. The king is said to have had it inscribed on a copper plate tāmra paṭṭa. In the Tamiḻ portion of the plates the king is requested to issue a śāsana.
According to Nārada, there are four ways of terminating a vyavahāra or dispute. They are 1. Dharma - abstract justice, 2. Vyavahāra - decision after contest, 3. Caritra - written law and 4. Rājaśāsanam - Order of the king. The command of the king is one which is not repugnant to sacred law or natural justice but becomes the final word (1. Ancient Hindu Judicature p. 23-24.) The word used in this case is Rājaśāsana and the Tamiḻ portion of the copper plate uses the same terminology. Hence in this case the king's śāsana was the last word.
Thus, it is seen, that both the Vēḷvikkuḍi and the Daḷavāypuram grants belong to the vyavahāra nirṇaya class of dāna-patra unlike the other copper plates. They clearly indicate that as early as eighth century C.E., the kings adopted tenets of Dharma Śāstra in deciding disputes in the Tamiḻ country. The Dharma Śāstra were the guiding texts in the day-to-day purchase, pledge, and all other transactions relating to property etc., and this goes in accordance with the repeated assertion of the rulers that they were followers of Manu. We also see that Dharma Śāstra was invariably a subject matter of study in all Cōḻa Vedic colleges. This clearly proves that though different parts of India were ruled by different dynasties, often fighting with each other, they all followed the Dharma Śāstras text in matters of civil and administrative justice throughout the country, which is of utmost importance for the study of cultural unity of India.
12.5. Tenure of Judges Recently some of the Judges of the Tamiḻnāḍu High court were transferred from one place to another. This attracted the attention of the public from different angles. The transfers were enforced, according to the authorities, to maintain the highest standards of the judiciary and improve its efficiency. Others questioned this stand and imputed motives. Even one of the judges expressed his disappointment over the transfers. In this connection an ancient lithic (epigraphic) record dated over one thousand years ago, regarding limitation of service tenure of the Judges, would come as a revelation to those interested in the history of Ancient Indian Judiciary.
The record is dated 930 CE, in the reign of the Cōḻa King Parāntaka and is found on a ceiling slab of the Bhaktavatsala temple of Tiruniṉṟavūr near Chennai, Tamiḻnāḍu. It is engraved in Tamiḻ letters and relates to the constitution of the Judiciary and the limitation of the service of judges.
Before the inscription is studied, it is necessary to note that the Cōḻa emperors, aimed at superlative efficiency in all walks of public administration and did achieve splendid standards, which even modern administrators would envy. The famous Uttaramērūr inscription, relating to the qualifications, dis-qualifications, and process of election to the village assembly is a well-known instance. Two important records from Tamiḻnāḍu, give a vivid picture of the constitution of judiciary in ancient times. One is the 8th century record that comes from the Pāṇḍya country and the other a 10th century record, from a place near Chennai, mentioned above.
The judiciary was by and large in the hands of elected village elders, and only in exceptional cases went to the territorial assemblies or ultimately to the king's council. The village courts served as the backbone of the judicial system in ancient India. Called the Pañchāyat system in modern times, the village judiciary is mostly misunderstood presently as the collective decision of the elders, without the application of any current legal procedures known to present times. Most historians held that the legal-judicial system came to be introduced and learned only after the advent of European rule in India. The 8th century record from Pāṇḍyan country, emphatically disproves this assumption. This record comes from Mānūr, in Tirunelveli district, and is effectively a written constitution of the village, regarding the election of judges to the village court. The entire village assembly met and drafted the constitution for selecting Judges.
The first qualification prescribed was that a person to be elected as a judge should be a master of at least one legal treatise. The legal treatises were known as Dharma Śāstra and there were many schools of the same as Manū, Yājñavalkya, Bṛhaspati, Parāsara, Bodhāyana, Āpastamba, Gautama and others. The aforementioned stipulation of a candidate judge indicate that the village courts were presided over by legal experts and not by casual elders, as is commonly understood. There were strict legal procedures to be adopted before the case is admitted in the village courts.
The Mānūr record also specifies that the person to be elected to the court should be one, known for his sterling conduct (suvrittarāy iruppār). Once a person of good conduct is elected, the village assembly should accept this person as a judge. Since this village was a Brāhmin settlement, it further prescribed that a person to be elected had to be a master of one Veda and one Brāhmaṇa text. Not just mere knowledge of the texts was sufficient, but he should have appeared for an examination in one Veda and one Brāhmaṇa and passed it. There are other aspects mentioned in the record with which we are not concerned here. Thus, the above record stipulated virtuous conduct, a pass in the stipulated examination and mastery of one law book as a basic requirement for being elected to the court. This record does not, however, stipulate the duration for which he had to serve or if he had served once the interval that was required for re-election.
This gap in information is filled by the Tiruniṉṟavūr record of 10th century mentioned earlier. It mainly addresses itself to the interval that was absolutely needed to serve again in the same court. The Tiruniṉṟavūr record is also a written constitution of the village judiciary drafted by the whole village assembly, which met for the purpose in 930 CE. The village judiciary and administrative committees were elected to serve for one term.
Once the elected judges had served for one term, they could not be elected for another five years to serve not only as judges but also in other administrative committees. The stipulation of the five-year period was reduced to two years in case of relatives like fathers, brothers, or sons of those who had served once.
It was thus made obligatory on the part of the judges not to serve two terms consequently in the same court within an interval of five years. Once the person had served in the court, his close relatives could not also aspire to become judges within two years of his service.
It is pertinent to recall the qualification stipulated for a Judge of the village court, a pass in the prescribed examination, mastery of a legal text and above all noble conduct. The Dharma Śāstra insist on the sanctity of judicial pronouncement, failing which, the judge was liable for punishment and would also incur a sin and his emancipation was in danger. Despite such strict standards, like upright judgements, good conduct, and high qualifications, his tenure was limited, and that he could not serve in the same court for five years subsequently.
This indicates the height to which the standards of judicial administration were taken in the Cōḻa period in the l0th and 11th century C.E.
Whether this system could be applied in modern times is not the concern of this write up. The standards are different now. But it does focus attention on the history of ancient Indian Judiciary, often labelled the Pañcāyat system which is brushed aside as a collective conventional decision, rather than based on written constitution and legal system. The ancient Indian Judiciary functioned only with solid legal procedures and written constitution (Lekhya Pramāṇam). In view of the importance of the Tiruniṉṟavūr constitution, an English rendering of the record is given below.
“This is the resolution adopted for the prosperity of our village, with effect from the month of Kumbha in the 23rd year, by us, the members of the great assembly, which include and who assembled in full, inclusive of the young and the old, in the great hall of our village on this day: When the judicial assembly and the (various) committees are to be constituted from this year onwards, the great assembly (Mahāsabhā) should meet in full in the Brahmasthāna (pērambalathē) of our village and select only those who are acceptable to the Mahāsabhā: Those who are so selected should not have served in judicial capacity or in the (administrative) committees within five years, prior (to the date of selection). The brothers, fathers, and sons of those who served (within) two years prior (to the date of selection), should be excluded. One who is so selected, should not be demanded to do (other) obligatory services, while serving in the Mahāsabhā. Those who demand other obligatory services from such selected persons, contrary to this resolution, are proclaimed offenders of the village. They (the selected) will receive one kunṟi of gold per duration? Those who complete their service, in the judicial assembly, and the (other) committees, should, settle and hand over accounts to the assembly. We the members of the great assembly resolved thus. Those who act contrary to this resolution, should pay twenty-five kaḻañcu of gold as fine at the court (dharmāsana) at the request of the shareholders of śrāvaṇai of our village. This resolution (maybe) inscribed on stone”. 12.6. Ancient Village Courts There is a growing disillusionment among our villagers today that our judicial system is not able to cope up with the increasing demands for justice especially in the rural areas for the courts are fewer in number and the number of pending cases in the thousands are swelling year after year with no sign of any conclusion. Both the contending parties are either exhausted or disappear without seeing any end to the disputes. The villagers also feel that complaints to the official machinery or police will not elicit justice as they are too occupied with serving their political masters and their interests.
It is interesting to note what happened thousand years ago in this connection. Four records coming from Tamiḻnāḍu ranging from 8th to 13th century, show that the ancient system paid attention mainly to village courts which could dispose of many cases at the level of the village itself. Every village had a court with judges appointed from among the permanent residents of the village and necessary administrative staff was provided for their effective functioning. The village judiciary was far more widespread than what it is today. There are records to show that in addition to the existing villages and their courts, whenever a new village or colony was established, a village court was established along with it by the king. In some instances, the village assembly itself created the necessary posts of judges and made appointments for them from among the residents. There are two inscriptions that could be cited to illustrate the point from the Koṅgu country, near Coimbatore, in the time of the Koṅgu Cōḻa rulers in the 13th century. In both the instances the then ruling king created two new villages and specified the constitution of the village court in his order. Both the inscriptions are in Pērūr Śiva temple. In the first instance the king issued an order to the chiefs of the nearby villages establishing a new village and detailing its four boundaries. The king created seven posts of judges for the new village appointing four Brāhmins to four posts and for the remaining three, he appointed three cultivators (Veḷḷāḷar-Gaunder) in the court. The Court was called “Manṟu”, the posts of the judges were called “Mantṟāḍu” and the judges “Mantṟāḍi” in the inscriptions. The king also separately appointed village chiefs who were called “Ūrāḷi”. Quite late in history the Manṟāḍis were considered the chiefs of villages as well, but this was not the case till the end of 14th century. This inscription makes it clear that the village chiefs were different from the judges of the village courts. The king also issued orders that no royal officer or government servant could enquire or interfere with the works like judgments (Manṟupāḍu), punishments of offences (daṇḍa-kuṟṟam) or any other function of the judiciary. (eppēr paṭṭa viyum nam karmikaḷ ārāya kadavar allākavum.
This ensured independence of the judiciary and freedom from governmental interference in any form. The participation of both Brāhmins and cultivating agriculturists show that all sections were represented in the court. This has not been appreciated or recognized by the historians so far.
The second illustration is also from the same village Pērūr in which the same king issued an order creating a new village. According to the record the king captured the modern town of Coimbatore, worshipped at the Śiva temple of Pērūr, created a new village, and gifted it as a temple village. He settled several cultivators in the new village and permitted them to create the required number of judges for the new village and appoint those who were acceptable to them. All those appointed as Manṟāḍi for the posts were agricultural Veḷḷāḷar. That there was no Brāhmin among the appointees shows the judiciary went beyond any upper caste prejudice in such administration. In the first illustration it was the king who created the posts and made the appointments and in the second the same king gave full freedom to the village to create and appoint the judges.
There are several inscriptions which refer to the village Manṟāḍis in the sense of judges in the Koṅgu country upto the end of 14th century. The post of Manṟāḍiyār gradually became a family tradition and the presence of a number of Manṟāḍiyār family in Koṅgu country is rooted in this tradition. This is also mentioned by some in a vague manner as the Pañchāyat system.
One of the important questions that arises in this system is whether a village judge who was not conversant with intricate legal points could serve properly and do justice to the disputes. There are some records that indicate clearly that no one without adequate knowledge of legal system could serve in the village court. The 8th century record from Mānūr in the Pāṇḍya country (discussed above) illustrates this point in unequivocal terms. According to various Dharma Śāstras, a candidate to be appointed as a judge had to have mastered at least one law text thoroughly besides having a knowledge of general qualification. The village of Mānūr was a Brāhmin habitation and so any one to be appointed should have learnt one Veda at least and one Brāhmaṇam text and should have mastered one Dharma Śāstra text. In the case of a new settler who became a permanent inhabitant of that village, he was expected to pass an examination in the legal text conducted for that purpose. A pass in the required educational qualification was thus a pre-requisite for the post, thus ensuring proper legal proceedings. For example, it was the duty of the parents to get their daughter of marriageable age married at the appropriate age but if they failed the girl had the right to choose a husband of her own. That was perfectly legal, and no one could interfere with her decision. If a group of villagers joined and said that it was the decision of the village, it was not considered valid in ancient times. The villagers had to abide by the written law code and not take law into their own hands.
Another stipulation was that the candidate to be appointed as a judge, in addition to the required qualification had to satisfy the villagers as one of proven integrity and conduct (suvrittarāy-iruppār). One could not be appointed just because he belonged to one section of the village or party, as is sometimes complained about in modern times.
While enough freedom was assured for the judiciary, the judges could also be tried for bribery or abetment to obstruction of justice. Further, there were many sub committees in villages to look after the secular administration, such as irrigation, fields and gardens, transport, maintenance of tanks, taxation etc., as part of the village assemblies. It is specifically mentioned in the Coimbatore record that those appointed for judiciary could not be appointed in any other committee. There were also Appeal courts like the territorial courts where one could appeal against a judgement and if not satisfied could appeal to Supreme court in ancient times which comprised of the king assisted by highly learned judges.
Besides, there was another important factor that contributed to the efficient functioning of the Village courts. It is known that the society set before itself highest ideals in matters of justice like the historic judgment of the Cōḻa King, Manu-nīti-chōḻaṉ who punished his own son, a crown prince, who caused the death of a calf. There were also the great legend of king Harischandra who stood for truth at all costs and refused to tell even a single lie when he lost everything of this world.
These ideals which were the by words of everyone in the society, there were many legal texts which were in Sanskrit, like the Manu-dharma-śāstra that were available through readable, lucid translations so that all villagers could follow. Ancient translations of Manu are available which narrowed the gap between the villagers and their judicial system.
This close acquaintance with the traditional law was very active till the end of 14th century and gradually faded with incursion of alien rule and faiths. With the establishment of colonial rule and thrusting of Western judicial system, the villagers lost contact with their own legal system both due to the foreign language and the play of intermediaries. The colonial system was not done away with, even after the advent of Independence but seemed to have got further strengthened. The native studies dwindled. But simultaneously the village court lost their place, and no attempt was made to get lucid translations of existing laws reaches of the villages. The transition from Independence to modern time has created a vacuum. Only some attention is being made now to come to grip with the situation. With the explosion of population, inadequate number of courts at village level and the rapid migration of intellectuals from the rural to urban areas and with no incentives for law students to serve in the village level, leaves a great gap in the concept of village judiciary. A rethinking towards Village court is perhaps required for establishment of more village courts suitably strengthened to cater to modern times.
12.7. Ancient Indian view on bribe The well-known Indian historian, Dr. Romilla Thapar has recently observed that Ancient Indians were sensitive to historical event which she discovered after a decade of study at the School of Indian and African studies in London around 1966. She suggested that attitude to the past is embedded in ancient texts that need to be brought to public notice by studies. In this connection how Ancient Indians looked at bribes and corruptions in public life is worth recollecting now as these dominate the national scenario in recent times. The ancient Indian life was regulated by well codified law books called Dharma Śāstras which are not religious codes but social regulations and behavior. Manu, Yājñavalkya, Vasiṣta, Parāsara and others were legal luminaries who went beyond their times and tried to study human behavior and formulated laws for the orderly conduct and wellbeing of the Society.
Yājñavalkya was an extraordinary personality whose code is admired even by modern exponents of Law. He has one full chapter on a crime called “Sāhasa”, which he defines and prescribes approved punishments. He defines it as acquiring illegally money (or property) by the misuse of money power, or authority, or using goonda force or using women which he declares a crime (Chapter 20, verses). Such a crime should be punished by two kinds of fines. A) voluntarily coming forward and admitting the crime before it was detected and B) suppressing the crime or concealing it up till was detected. In the first case the punishment prescribed was double the amount of such illegal money accepted. Supposing one receives about 250 crores of rupees he shall be fined twice that amount that is he must pay 500 crores for voluntary admission. If on the other hand he conceals the crime till the governmental enquiry he should be fined four times the amount received illegally that, is he must pay 1000 crores as fine.
Another provision in the same crime was making another person to accept the money on one’s behalf to escape from punishment, that is Benami transactions. In this case making another person to transact on one’s behalf should also be fined four times. The man who accepted it on another’s behalf will also be fined similarly for his crime. This law is equal to both men and women and there was no question some can escape on gender basis. This crime is called “sāhasam” and was included among the five great crimes against the society- Pañca-mahā-pātaka.
But this was not the end. One who has been punished for such a crime cannot stand for elections to any public functions throughout his lifetime according to the code recorded in the thousand-year-old Cōḻa inscription at Uttaramērūr. Not only was he barred, but all including his brother, father, and other relatives in his father’s side, mother’s side or his wife side or related to him in any form. This ban is prescribed for seven generations. Such a ban is found along with other bans like if one is elected in a family, no other member of his family can stand for election for some prescribed terms, there are other more rigorous rule for elections we cannot go over here but which made democratic values more dynamic, with built in safeguards to prevent public pilferages. 12.8. A case of Saivācārya An interesting case of Śaivācārya is recorded in the Vīrattāṇam of Tirukkadavūr, Maturai taluk of Tañjāvūr district. The history of the case is as follows. In the time of Kulōtuṅga Cōḻa III, a Śaivācārya Kālavinōda Paṇḍita, who was serving in the temple died, but his brother's family were serving as Śaivācāryas of the temple under service tenure. On his demise, another Śivācārya of the village, named Śaiva Vidyādhara Brahma Mahārājaṉ and his father Śaiva Cintāmaṇi Brahma Mahārājaṉ got an order as though issued by the king on a leaf and had the same inscribed on the wall of the temple and started worshipping in the temple. This news reached the Rājaguru, royal priest Swamidēvar, who decreed that the Śaiva priests Brahmīśvaram Udaiyāṉ Kūttapirāṉ Kāla Vinīodapaṇḍita and Śiva Sūrya Brahma Mahārājan, who were serving earlier (probably along with the deceased Śīvācārya) were duly qualified and eligible to serve, they are the proper appointees. They alone will receive the service tenure and are eligible to oversee nitya, naimittika, śāstrārthaṅgaḷ in the temple, and will have the right to worship in the Vīraṭṭāṇam temple, the nearby Mayānam-udiyār temple, the worship of festive image of Kāla Kāla Deva, and Kūttādum dēva (Naṭarāja image) in the temple, and in addition the right of worshipping two sub temples within Vīraṭṭāṇam temple. This news was conveyed to the king by Vikrama Cōḻa Brahma Mahārājaṉ. The king Kulōttuṅga ordered that this order of Swamidēvar should be enforced and will take effect from the 16th year and the inscription recorded on the wall of the temple. This order was drafted and written by the Officer Tirumantra ōlai, Rājanārāyaṇa Mūvēndavēlāṉ. Thus, the order was directly dictated by the king. This inscription is interesting as it shows that the Rājaguru under the Cōḻa had the last say in matters of religious affairs. There seems to have been several Śaiva Brāhmaṇas who were conferred the royal title Brāhma/Mahārājas at Tirukkadavūr (there seems to be some confusion in reading the inscription). The government epigraphist has said that the king on the demise of the first Śaivācārya appointed the other person but he Rājaguru cancelled the order and issued the new order. But the inscription is clear enough and states that the other Śaivācārya himself caused such an order falsely and got it written on the wall. How this was tolerated is not mentioned in the record (inscription no 40 of South Indian inscription vol XXII.).
12.9. A dispute between temple and Brahma Kṣētra in 14th century There is an interesting dispute between the Brāhmaṇas and the local temple authorities at Tiruppātirippuliyūr, (Cyudalireinc no 759 of SII. Vol VII.). The dispute arose when the region was under the rule of a later Pāṇḍya Vikrama Pāṇḍya, in the beginning of 14th century.
The following is the case. The authorities of the Śiva temple of Tiruppātirippuliyūr were enjoying the lands of the village as the property in the name of the temple. They consecrated an image of Subrahmaṇya in the temple and arranged for its regular worship. Towards meeting the expenses, they purchased two Mā of land in the name of Caṇḍēśvara of the temple. It is customary to carry out all transactions for the temple made in the name of Caṇḍikēśvara. And so, it becomes the absolute property of the temple.
The Brāhmaṇas of the village objected to this sale of land saying it was “Brahmakṣētra” belonging to the Brāhmins and cannot be sold or purchased by the temple. This became a big issue and was taken to the king himself for adjudication. The king ordered two of his officers to conduct a thorough enquiry and it became such an emotional issue, one Mahēśvara immolated himself for the cause.
The two officers went to the village and were surrounded by the Nāṭṭārs, the cultivators and others. The two officers Pallavarāiyar and Aḻakiya Maṇavāḷapperumāḷ were directed to see that if the claim of Nāṭṭār was true their claim must be upheld.
The officers first called the Brāhmaṇas asked them to produce documentary proof to show their claim. The Brāhmaṇas said that they had no documentary proof. The officers told them they were not cultivating these lands and that they were being cultivated by Veḷḷāḷar, Alavar, Paḷḷi and Parambar who were the actual cultivators of the lands. How did the Brāhmins lay claim over the lands? The Brāhmins then produced the documents to show that they have been selling the lands among themselves and mortgaging as well. The judicial officers rejected their contention holding these documents could not be accepted as proof of ownership.
They then turned to temple authorities and Nāṭṭārs to produce documentary proof of their rights. The temple authorities produced documents which showed the documents given by the same Brāhmaṇas accepting the lands as the thirunāmattukkāṇi of the temple and documents showing the payments made by the Brāhmaṇas, the dues to the temple which they issued annually. Also, they showed documents of payments on land revenue to the temple, issued by the officials of the early ruler Kōpperuñciṅga proven by them with a stone inscription on the temple. Further, it was seen the current Pāṇḍya ruler had issued a royal order making the whole village and its adjunct as tax free thirunāmattukkāṇi to the temple in his fifth year. These documents were verified by the two officials who decreed the land belonged to the temple. The king then issued an order which was taken around in the village as the final settlement and the Brāhmins were also taken around in the procession as a mark of acceptance. The case was settled in favour of the temple and their rights upheld. It is an interesting case where in insistence of documentary proof was the main prevalent guide for settlement of dispute called Lekhya Pramāṇa in Dharma Śāstra, in which the temple inscriptions emerged as authentic proof.
The three Pāṇḍya copper plates discussed earlier which were original judicial documents were named the Madurai plates of Pāṇḍya Arikēsari, (mid 7th century) and the second called Vēḷvikkuḍi grant of Parāntaka Neduñjaḍaiyaṉ, and the third the Daḷavāypuram plates of Parāntaka Vīra Nārāyaṇa (9th century). All three relate to gifts of lands made to Vedic Brāhmaṇas. In the first instance, the king conferred the land to a Brāhmaṇa for his erudition. The second was a land gifted to a Vedic Brāhmaṇa at the conclusion of a yāga by the king Palyāgasālai Mudukuḍumi Peruvaḻuti, but it was snatched away by a subsequent ruler of a different dynasty. When the earlier dynasty was re-established, the ruling king after verifying documents re-conferred the land. The third was also a gift of Vedic village to a group of Brāhmins which was misappropriated by a cultivator, but the king had it returned after enquiry. However, in the 14th century, the dispute was between the Naṭṭārs of the local temple and Brāhmaṇas where the false claim by the Brāhmaṇas was rejected and land conferred to the temple of Tiruppātirippuliyūr. In all four cases (three between 7th-9th centuries and one in the 14th century), judicial documents were verified even after several centuries. The concept of documentary evidence and verification to settle disputes illustrates the kings’ knowledge of Dharma Śāstras as seen through these cases. It is evident from these cases that the Vedic education established a very highly organised society.
